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THE PRAYER CASE
First Amendment Revisiont
LAWRENCE X. CUSACK*

I

to appear before the Committee as a representative
of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York at the request of
His Eminence, Francis Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York,
whose views are embodied in the following remarks.
After careful study, I have come to the conclusion that the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Engel v. Vitale, declaring unconstitutional the New York Regents' Prayer, was a grave error
in judicial judgment, a decision out of line with the conscience and
religious heritage of the American people and one which foreshadows
an ominous tendency to undermine cherished traditions of this nation.
In my opinion, the error is too serious, the danger to our American
institutions too immediate, to be left to the evolutionary process of
corrective decisions by the Court itself. In my judgment, the indicated
solution is an amendment of the Constitution. For reasons later stated,
I respectfully submit that any such amendment should be directed to
the underlying constitutional fallacy of the Court's decision-a misinterpretation of the no establishment clause of the first amendmentrather than to the narrow issue of a voluntary, nondenominational
prayer.
As Archbishop of New York, Cardinal Spellman is directly and immediately concerned with the harmful effect of this decision upon the
moral and spiritual welfare of the tens of thousands of Catholic children who attend public schools in the ten counties of the State of New
York that comprise the Archdiocese of New York. Although the Archdiocese maintains and administers a parochial school system, consisting of 423 elementary and high schools with more than 216,000 children in attendance, it is, nevertheless, estimated that there are well in
excess of 100,000 Catholic children in attendance at public elementary
and high schools within the Archdiocese. The concern of Cardinal
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Spellman springs also from the apprehension of a patriotic citizen as to the longrange effects of the Court's decision upon
succeeding generations of our country's
children and upon the future general welfare of our nation. On the very day that
the decision of the Court was announced,
His Eminence publicly stated that he was
"shocked and frightened" at a decision
which, he said, "strikes at the very heart
of the Godly tradition in which America's
children have for so long been raised."
I am convinced that the Supreme Court's
decision in the Regents' Prayer Case is
based upon an erroneous interpretation of
our Constitution, but nothing I say is intended either to undermine the Court's
status or to impugn the motives of the
Justices. As a representative of Cardinal
Spellman and as a member of the Bar, I
have the greatest respect for the Supreme
Court as an institution. In taking issue
with the Court, I am doing no more than
what many Justices of the Court have
themselves often done in their dissenting
opinions and in their extra-judicial statements. The Court has never held itself out
to be an infallible tribunal and, in fact,
on many occasions has expressly or impliedly acknowledged its own fallibility by
reversing earlier decisions. Indeed, the need
for informed and constructive criticism of
the work of the Court has been frequently
stressed by responsible authorities. In
1898, Mr. Justice Brewer stated:
It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or helped
by being spoken of as beyond criticism.
On the contrary, the life and character of
its justices should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments subject to the freest criticism.
And the late Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone
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has said:
When the courts deal, as ours do, with
great public questions, the only protection
against unwise decisions, and even judicial
usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless comment upon it.
Only recently, the President of the American Bar Association reminded American
lawyers that:
It is the inherent right and the highest
duty of the Bar to analyze, criticize, make
recommendations, and work toward improvement in both the rulings and the operation of courts, from the lowest to the
highest level.
Its right flows inevitably from the lawyer's status of citizenry, and it is underscored and emphasized by his professional
standing and his devotion to juridical
science.
With regard to this very decision, the Supreme Court has not been free from the
criticism of many eminent constitutional
lawyers, professors and judges of other
courts. The Chief Justice of one of our
midwestern states has, for example, declared that by this decision the Supreme
Court has played "recklessly with the Constitution of this country."
In differing with the decision of the Supreme Court, I am by no means attacking
the principle of separation of Church and
State as set forth in the religious freedom
clauses of the first amendment. The Catholics of this country not only respect that
principle and revere it as part of our Constitution, but they are wholeheartedly in
favor of it as one of the keystones of our
liberties. Although individual Catholics may
differ as to the ultimate ramifications of the
Court's action in declaring unconstitutional
the New York Regents' Prayer, they do
not differ in their respect for and adher-
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ence to the principle of separation that the
Court attempted to apply in rendering its
decision. Throughout the history of this
country, spokesmen for the Catholic
Church have made it clear time and time
again that American Catholics are irrevocably dedicated to the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State,
properly interpreted and properly applied.
Adherence to that principle was enunciated
in the early years of our nation by Archbishop John Carroll, the first Catholic Bishop of our country. Since then, that adherence has been reaffirmed time after
time. More than forty years ago, Cardinal
Gibbons wrote that:
No establishment of religion is being
dreamed of here by anyone; but were it
to be attempted, it would meet with united
opposition from the Catholic people,
priests and prelates.
Essentially the same thought was reiterated
in 1948 by Archbishop McNicholas, Chairman of the Administrative Board of the
National Catholic Welfare Conference,
who said:
We deny absolutely and without any qualification that the Catholic Bishops of the
United States are seeking a union of church
and state by any endeavors whatsoever,
either proximate or remote. If tomorrow,
Catholics constituted a majority in our
country, we would not seek a union of
church and state.
In 1960, Archbishop Vagnozzi, Apostolic
Delegate of the Vatican to the United
States, made a public statement to substantially the same effect.
It is a fact of American history that a
motivating factor in the establishment of
the Catholic parochial school system in this
country was objection to the indoctrination in public schools of Catholic children

in the religious tenets and practices of other
denominations. Catholics would make the
same objection today to denominational
teaching or services in our public school
system. But this is a far cry from the practice which the Supreme Court has condemned in the New York Regents' Prayer
Case. There, school children were merely
given an opportunity voluntarily to participate in the saying of a short, simple, nondenominational declaration of dependence
upon God and request for His blessings.
This is not denominational religious instruction. On the contrary, the vast majority
of Catholics believe that such a practice in
our public school system is no more than a
recognition that our public school system
is not designed to make God a stranger in
the classroom to those children who wish
to acknowledge Him, and that it is no part
of our national heritage to compel our
public officials to turn their backs on the
Supreme Being who, since the days of our
Founding Fathers, has guided and watched
over the destiny of this nation. It is in that
connection and in that spirit that I voice
my criticism of the Court's decision.
My disagreement with the decision is
that the Court has misread history and misconceived and misapplied a great constitutional principle. In attempting to safeguard a clause of the Constitution that was
originally intended to prohibit Congress
from creating, or aiding in the creation of,
a state religion, the Court passed lightly
over its own observation that the prayer in
question seemed "relatively insignificant,"
and proceeded to render a decision which,
in the light of American history and the
purposes underlying the first amendment,
was unrealistic, extreme and doctrinaire. In
short, the Court's proper concern with
keeping the principle of separation invio-
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late led it to declare a theory of absolutism
with regard to the relations between
Church and State, so that, even if not intended, the Court's decision may have the
practical effect of prohibiting even the merest mention of God in the public school
classroom. This was carrying to the extreme a constitutional principle which, reasonably interpreted and applied, should be
a doctrine on which all Americans of goodwill, whatever their faith, could agree.
The alarming aspect of the Regents'
Prayer Case is not so much the particular
point decided as what the decision portends in terms of shaping our society. In
legal effect, the decision amounted to no
more than a declaration that a particular
prayer composed by a particular state body
could not be officially sponsored for use in
the public schools of a particular state.
But, in practical effect, it banned all such
prayers, even though nondenominational
and noncompulsory. As a result, the decision has a significance that goes far beyond
the legal issue involved in that case. On
the very day the Court's opinion was released, a leading figure in the fight against
the nondenominational prayer declared that
the decision
makes it clear that all religious practices
in the public schools, such as Bible reading, prayer recitation and religious holiday observances, are unconstitutional.
Within a few days others, adopting the
reasoning of the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas, were asserting that the
Court's prohibition seems to apply equally
to prayers said at the opening of our courts
and at the daily convening of our legislatures. It was soon announced by selfstyled protectors of civil liberties that, on
the strength of the Court's decision, an attack would be made on the use of the

phrase "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to our flag. In the light of these interpretations, the Court's decision seems
to forecast a drift toward a Godless society, toward the enthronement of secularism as the American religion. Our public
schools are already being referred to in
some quarters as our "secular school system." The ultimate objective of a wellorganized, well-financed minority, ready at
the most trifling excuse to provoke litigation, is to root out of American life all religious values. If they are successful, they
will create an ideological vacuum which
will be filled by secularism. If this comes
to pass, it will threaten the stability of our
nation for, as our first President said in
his Farewell Address:
Of all the dispositions and habits which
lead to political prosperity, religion and
morality are indispensable supports ...
Reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that national morality can prevail
in exclusion of religious principle. It is
substantially true that virtue or morality
is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more
or less force to every species of free government. Who, that is a sincere friend to
it, can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the
fabric?
Many students of the Supreme Court
have observed that in interpreting our Constitution the Court keeps attuned to the
temper of the times and to the manifest will
and aspirations of the American public.
This leaves room for hope that, if left to
its own devices, the Supreme Court would
in the course of time find opportunity to
reshape its interpretation of the no establishment clause so as to bring it once again
into line with the popular conception that
has prevailed since the early days of this
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nation. But for the Congress to stand aside
and await that possibility would be to leave
to chance and to the future predilections
of a small group of men a matter that is
presently vital to our way of life. The eyes
of the world are upon this country, looking
to us now for the kind of inspired leadership that will preserve our world from the
aggressions of an alien society that has
long since drained religion out of its own
Godless way of life. I submit that the one
sure, effective and early solution is an
amendment to our Constitution which
would remedy the result of the Regents'
Prayer Case by correcting the Court's misreading of the no establishment clause.
In my opinion, any such amendment
should not be directed merely at the Court's
holding that the State of New York cannot constitutionally compose a nondenominational prayer for use in the public schools
of that State. It should, rather, be directed
at the malady that is at the core of the
decision-the misreading of the historical
intent underlying the adoption of the religious protection clauses of the first amendment. The root of the Court's error was
that it lost sight of the fact that those who
drafted the clauses intended not to prefer
irreligion and Godlessness over religion,
but to make certain that government, while
cooperating with all religions, did not establish a state religion or prefer any one religion over others. I believe, then, that any
constitutional amendment should go beyond a mere declaration that the voluntary
recitation of nondenominational prayer is
constitutionally permissible, thereby avoiding the serious risk that such a declaration
would be misinterpreted to prohibit by implication traditional practices not specifically authorized. The amendment should
rather make clear what our Founding

Fathers themselves thought they had made
clear, that our Constitution favors government cooperation with religion so long as
such cooperation is devoid of favored treatment to any one religion or denomination.
Such an amendment would do no more
than restore to the first amendment the interpretation which the Supreme Court itself gave it in 1952 in Zorach v. Clauson,
the New York released time case, when
Mr. Justice Douglas, whose viewpoint now
seems so extreme, had himself said:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being....
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows
the best of our traditions. For then it
respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs.
I respectfully suggest that this Committee propose a constitutional amendment
which would restore the original concept
of the no establishment clause which was,
as the learned Thomas Cooley wrote just
before the turn of this century, to prohibit
"the setting up or recognition of a state
church, or at least the conferring upon one
church of special favors and advantages
which are denied to others." An amendment framed along these lines would revitalize the general sentiment that underlay
the adoption of the first amendment. That
sentiment, as Joseph Story, Supreme Court
Justice and Professor of Law, said more
than 125 years ago, was that religion
"ought to receive encouragement from the
state, so far as it was not incompatible
with private rights of conscience, and the
(Continued on page 343)
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freedom of religious worship." In this way
the American people can forever protect
the no establishment clause from the doctrinaire absolutism of the secularists and
restore a proper balance between that
clause and the free-exercise-of-religion
clause of the first amendment. One way to
accomplish this would be to restate the
first amendment so that the religious protection clauses would read:
Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of a state religion or,
in encouraging religion, the preferment
of any religion or denomination, or pro-

hibiting the free exercise of religion ...
An amendment such as this would, in
my opinion, strike at the heart of the doctrinaire and fallacious concept that there
should be an absolute separation between
Church and State. Such conceptual absolutism is impractical and unrealistic and if
permitted to become imbedded in the first
amendment could lead in the future only
to other decisions that would be offensive
to the religious traditions of the American
people and potentially destructive to American institutions.
That concludes my statement. On behalf of His Eminence, Cardinal Spelman,
I thank this Committee for the opportunity
to present these views.

